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Introduction and methodology 
This article focuses on the structure and regulation of electricity markets and how this 
enables, or constrains, the transfer of prioritised low-carbon generation technologies to these 
markets, as expressed by governments in their national Technology Needs Assessments 
(TNAs). While the concept of 'technology transfer' is a largely top-down and politically-
driven agenda principally defined in the UN's Climate Change Convention (Article 4), and 
hence is lacking in detailed operational definitions, we do not seek to analyse the debate over 
what is, or can be considered, technology transfer. Instead we base our analysis upon the 
assumption that technology transfer, as a real-world process, refers to the trade in 
technologies, principally between the private sector of OECD and major 'emerging' 
economies and the private sector or government enterprises in less-developed countries 
(Karakosta et al., 2010; Popp, 2011). Most technologies can be categorised as either hardware 
or software, though it is often relevant, especially in complex systems such as grid-supplied 
electricity, to talk of the transfer of management and organisational 'know how', often 
referred to as 'orgware' (Boldt et al., 2012). Regardless of the form of technology, our second 
major assumption is that transfer cannot occur in the absence of clear financial incentives to 
invest and/or in the presence of financial barriers to purchase a specific technology. While 
there are a range of barriers to technology transfer, both financial and non-financial, we 
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choose to focus our analysis on the financial and economic barriers, where 'financial' refers to 
'internal' factors such as a project's rate of return (RoR) on investment and 'economic' refers 
to the wider context of a given economy.  
We base our comparative analysis upon information gathered by the TNA project, 
funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and implemented by UNEP and the UNEP 
Risø Centre since 2010. However there are limitations to using this information for scientific 
purposes since the TNA process is politically driven and hence the outputs are often 
aspirational and/or lacking in the provision of detailed, comparable, data. As such, we use the 
outputs of the TNAs for indicative purposes only and emphasise that our contribution to 
literature is limited to an analysis of these country-driven processes. However, they are 
significant in that they represent the formal conclusion of TNAs conducted by select non-
Annex I countries to the UNFCCC. When defining the key characteristics of the electricity 
markets for the four countries we draw upon a range of secondary data, as well as 
descriptions provided by countries themselves in the TNA process. Our comparative analysis 
also focuses upon the primary energy resource base of each country, how this influences the 
present-day electricity generation mix as well as the opportunities and prospects for 
investment in low-carbon alternatives.  
Electricity market structures and GHG emissions 
As part of the free-market or 'neoliberal' political wave that spread through much of Latin 
America from the late 1980s, many countries in the continent implemented electricity market 
reform policies. In nearly every country that has undergone electricity sector reform, 
generation has been liberalised with transmission and distribution markets operating as 
regulated (private) monopolies (Yi-Chong, 2006). Indeed Latin America was the major 
recipient of electricity sector liberalisation policies, where private investment totalled US$90 
billion between 1990 and 2001, accounting for almost half of all electricity sector 
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investments in developing countries (World Bank, 2004). European and US-based companies 
were the largest players. Some of these reformed electricity markets managed to successfully 
introduce large scale competition in the generation sector, and to significantly reduce the 
wholesale cost of electricity (Grimston, 2004). This success has been helped by technical 
developments since the late 1980s, particularly the rise of low capital cost combined cycle 
gas turbine generators (CCGT) which, along with relatively cheap natural gas prices 
(notwithstanding the 2004-2008 inflation) have enabled a dramatic reduction in the cost and 
economies of scale in generation and supply of electricity (Colpier and Cornland, 2002; Peña-
Torres and Pearson, 2000). Where these reforms have been adopted in Latin America, they 
have been mainly, but not exclusively, initiated, directed and part financed by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), often as an integral part of ‘structural adjustment’ 
plans or conditionalities on further loans and financial aid (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). 
The shift from public to private ownership and control is the cornerstone of the reform 
agenda. However, not all countries in Latin America pursued market-driven reforms and in 
reality there exist a diversity of governance frameworks for national electricity markets, as 
exemplified in this article by Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. As 
such, it is relevant to conduct a comparative analysis of the key financial and economic 
barriers to technology transfer in these four countries, assessing the main conclusions against 
each country's existing electricity market and regulatory frameworks. Here, the main focus is 
on the incentives for investment (private or public) in low-carbon generation technologies.  
Latin American electricity sector emissions 
In 2008, CO2 emissions from the Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC) totalled 1530.6 
megatons (Mt), accounting for just 5% of the global total. While CO2 emissions in the LAC 
region increased from 3.06 to 3.36 t/CO2 per capita between 2000 and 2008, this was 
outstripped by economic growth whereby emissions/GDP decreased from 0.75 to 0.68 Gg 
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CO2/million USD. However, between 1990 and 2006, the carbon content of energy 
consumption in the LAC region increased from 2.82 to 2.89 Gg CO2/103 boe, reflecting a 
greater overall dependence on more carbon-intense 'fossil fuels' (Sheinbaum-Pardo and Ruiz 
2012).  
With regard to the GHG emissions from the electricity sector reforms, there remains 
little evidence to indicate that free markets are an inherently cleaner mechanism through 
which to manage and deliver supplies. While many countries have reported significant 
reductions in technical losses due to more waste-conscious private operators, it is also their 
primary concern to increase sales revenue, which equates to greater consumption, hence 
emissions. It so happens that much of the new generation capacity in reformed markets is 
powered by the combustion of natural gas, a cheaper and less carbon intense fossil fuel than 
coal or oil, and so market reforms have often been held up as 'green', especially in many 
OECD countries that already had a predominant fossil-fuel base (Haselip, 2007). But the 
emphasis is on ‘cheaper’ because there is no inherent reason why the market should choose a 
cleaner fuel to power electricity generation, and indeed the opposite is often the case, 
especially in low-income countries that have significant reserves of coal, such as India 
(Bhattacharyya, 2007). Focusing on the electricity sector, Ruiz-Mendoza and Sheinbaum-
Pardo (2010) analysed four Latin America countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and 
Mexico), all of which had undergone a process of industry privatisation deregulation, and 
found that these market-based reforms did not lead to a reduction in CO2 emission per MWh. 
Indeed, their analysis revealed that CO2 emissions from electricity generation increased in all 
countries apart from Colombia, reflecting a greater dependence on fossil fuels for new 
electricity generation.  
  5 
 
Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) 
The Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) aim to assist developing countries in identifying 
priority mitigation and adaptation technology needs, and analysing the barriers to transfer, 
access and implementation of these technologies. On the analytical side, a clear and robust 
methodology based on the application of wide ranging criteria was developed and applied to 
a limited number of key sectors in all countries, adapted by countries to take into account 
national circumstances, based upon Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA).  
Unlike the first generation of TNAs conducted in the early 2000s, the new round 
placed a greater emphasis on the analysis of market barriers to the transfer and diffusion of 
individual technologies prioritised by countries, followed by detailed plans to remove / 
overcome these barriers, i.e. specific policies and actions implemented by governments, 
businesses consumer groups (where relevant) and civil society. As such, the  new round of 
TNAs had a strong emphasis on involving national stakeholders, sector-specific experts, and 
high-level government and private sector representatives in order to ensure that the project’s 
findings are appropriate, realistic (i.e. implementable) and endorsed by local communities 
and  government ministers alike. Within the scope of the new round of TNAs, countries were 
recommended to focus on 2-4 sectors and to prioritise a similar number of technologies 
within each sector. The rationale for conducting a more focused study reflected the emphasis 
placed on the subsequent stages of the project work, which involved an in-depth analysis of 
the barriers facing the identified technologies and the development of a ‘Technology Action 
Plan’, i.e. a detailed road-map for creating an enabling framework for the diffusion of the 
prioritised technologies. 
  The TNAs considered in this paper have been conducted in Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic. The processes have been nationally driven, where the 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MinCTIP), Ministry of Environment, 
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Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET), Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Environment (CITMA), and the Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resources 
(MMARN) oversaw the work in the four countries, respectively. The results of the 
prioritization and key barriers for the transfer and diffusion of the prioritised technologies are 
shown in annex 1 and 2. 
Argentina 
Argentina's GHG emissions from the three sectors covered in the TNA process (energy, 
agriculture and waste - excluding LULUCF) totalled 282 MtCO2-eq in 2000 (República 
Argentina, 2009), accounting for 95% of total national emissions. This figure had risen to 311 
MtCO2-eq by 2005 and BAU projections for 2030 show that these emissions will grow a 
further 89.8% against the 2005 baseline, to a total of 591 MtCO2-eq (Fundación Bariloche, 
2008). Prior to market liberalisation, the majority of installed capacity in the Argentine 
electricity sector was hydro-based. Since the early 1990s, the majority of new generation 
capacity has been thermal, mostly utilising the country's abundant natural gas. This transition, 
from predominantly hydro to thermal-based generation, has resulted in a higher share of 
national GHG emissions coming from the electricity sector, although the efficiency of the 
country's thermal plants increased by 0.9% between 2000 and 2009, averaging a relatively 
high 41% in 2009 (Enerdata, 2011). Overall CO2 emissions per kWh generated (CO2 / kWh) 
grew 0.3% between 2000 and 2009, contributing 25% of national emissions (IEA, 2012). 
The restructuring of Argentina's state-owned electricity enterprises began in early 
1992 with the passage of the Electricity Act (Federal Law Nº 24,065), after which the three 
stages of production (generation, transmission and distribution) were vertically disintegrated. 
Generation became competitive, with transmission and distribution markets operating as 
regulated private monopolies (Chisari et al, 1999; ENRE, 1997). The Wholesale Electric 
Market (MEM) that supplies 93% of Argentina’s demand has an installed capacity of 24,352 
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MW (as of 2008), of which 54% is thermal, 42 % hydroelectric, and 4% nuclear 
(CAMMESA, 2009). Private-sector investments in the electricity sector since market reform 
totalled US$12.5 billion, up to the economic crisis of 2001/2, of which 60% constituted new 
(i.e. non-purchase) investments, with much of this coming from foreign investors (CAISE, 
2002). 
  In accordance with the 1992 Electricity Law 24,065, the Department of Energy 
(which exists within the Ministry of Economy) is responsible for establishing regulations and 
industry policies, including rules on technical dispatching, the calculation of wholesale 
generation prices, and settling appeals made against the regulatory agencies. The market 
regulator, ENRE, is charged with ensuring private companies comply with this law, imposing 
appropriate sanctions, making sure concession agreements are carried out, preventing anti-
competitive behaviour and monitoring service quality. ENRE’s original function was also to 
establish bases for calculating regulated rates and ensuring that they were applied. 
Fundamentally, the regulatory mechanism for distribution prices operates on an RPI-x basis 
where productivity gains ‘x’ were proposed to be adjusted every 5 years. During the decade 
after the country's economic crisis, the government implemented a 're-reform' agenda for 
public services, whereby the majority of privatised utilities continued to be owned and 
managed by private actors, albeit with greater regulatory oversight and public policy 
intervention to incentivise energy efficiency and investment (both private and public) at a 
time when tariffs were frozen and hence relatively cheap  (Haselip and Potter, 2010).  
While the federal government legislated a feed-in tariff (FIT) for renewable energy 
generation technologies, which became operational in 2009 under National Decree 5620/ 
2009, the value and structure of the FIT is unlikely to provide sufficiently strong economic 
incentives for large-scale investment in grid-connected renewable energy technologies 
(RETs) generation. Argentina's FIT caps support for RET installations of up to 30 MW 
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capacity, thus seemingly ideal for SMEs that were the focus of the country's TNA analysis 
(see appendix 2). However unlike many other FIT policies which offer a clear, fixed, tariff 
per MWh supplied to the grid, eligible generators in Argentina are paid a maximum 'premium 
payment' of $US 0.004/kWh (for non-PV technology) on top of the wholesale electricity 
price, for up to 15 years. While this is designed to make tariff support more realistic, i.e. 
linked to the market price of conventional generation, it simply does not provide sufficient 
economic incentive to invest in most RETs. For example, the market spot-price for a MWh of 
electricity on the wholesale market averaged $US 52.4/MWh in 2009. The maximum FIT for 
non-PV technologies adds just $US 4 to this figure, whereas, for example, recent wind power 
projects are calculating their costs at between $US 120-158 per MWh (Jacobs et al, 2013). As 
such, the success of the liberalised electricity generation market, where wholesale prices fell 
by nearly 50% during the first 5 years after reform from US$ 48.76/MWh in 1992 to US$ 
25.67/MWh in 1997, is itself a fundamental barrier to RET generation.  
However while low electricity prices serve to benefit economic growth in the short 
run, these prices have only been made possible by an increasing dependence on natural gas 
which is, ultimately, unsustainable hydrocarbon energy. More to the point, Argentina's 
domestic production of natural gas is down 10% from its peak in 2006 and, importantly, the 
country became a net importer in 2008 (IEA, 2013), pushing up prices. While the government 
hopes to develop Argentina's shale gas reserves, which some experts estimate are the world's 
third largest after China and the US, proven natural gas reserves declined by 50% from 2002 
to 2012, to a total of 13.4 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). This is a worrying trend for the electricity 
sector which accounts for approximately 33% of Argentina's total natural gas consumption. 
Acute shortages of natural gas during the winter months create price volatilities, and 
underline the sense of investing in CHP technology, as prioritised in the TNA (see appendix 
1), when heat demand is at its highest. In conclusion, while the long-term trend for wholesale 
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electricity prices appears to be upward, there exist minimal financial incentives to invest in 
grid-connected RETs in the short term, where a significant gap divides the value of the 
market spot price + FIT from the present per MWh cost of RET generation. 
Costa Rica 
The contribution of Costa Rica to global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) is negligible. The 
country emitted about 7.9 MtCO2-eq in 2000 and 8.8 MtCO2-eq in 2005, including emissions 
from land-use change, equal to 0.02% of global emissions. The energy sector, which includes 
electricity generation and transmission, is the primary contributor to national GHG emissions. 
In 2005, the energy sector emitted about 5.7 MtCO2-eq (MINAET, 2009), equivalent to 65% 
of the country's total emissions. In 2007, the government of Costa Rica committed to become 
the first carbon neutral country by 2021, thus focusing their attention on the transfer of low-
carbon technologies to the energy sector.  
The electricity sector in Costa Rica relies almost entirely on clean energy sources. 
However Costa Rica imports fossil fuels, mainly petroleum used in the transport sector and in 
2011 the national primary energy supply came 94% from renewables and 6% from non-
renewable sources. In 2011, 91% of electricity was generated from renewable sources, 
mainly hydroelectric. Over the last few years, the quality of electricity supply has 
deteriorated, with blackouts and rationing, combined with tariff increases driven by a lack of 
market-based pricing. As such, the main risks and challenges that the electricity sector has to 
cope with are market vulnerability due to the increasing share of imported fossil fuels in the 
primary energy mix, low investments in infrastructure, minimal market competition and 
increasing electricity demand. At current levels of demand growth it has been estimated that 
generation will have to double from 1,960 MW in 2006 to 3,852 MW in 2021 (REEGLE, 
2012). 
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In Costa Rica, there is no specific legislation covering the electricity sector. Instead, 
the generation, transmission, distribution and retail of electricity are regulated by numerous 
laws that constitute the legal framework and identify the rights, roles and responsibilities of 
public and private stakeholders. In order to stimulate the use of renewable energy sources, the 
government put in place a financial, regulatory and policy framework including tax 
exemptions on renewable energy equipment. Electricity generation is mainly in the hands of 
the State through the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (ICE) and the National Company of 
Power and light (CNFL). ICE is also in charge of electricity Transmission and operates the 
National Electric System (SEN). The distribution of electricity is largely managed by ICE 
and CNFL though various municipal companies, though cooperatives are also involved in the 
generation and distribution of electricity. In addition private companies, including those that 
own and operate small hydroelectric installations, sugarcane refineries and wind turbines also 
supply electricity to the grid, though this electricity must be sold to ICE who then transmits to 
distributors (REEGLE, 2012). 
Given that more than 90% of electricity generation already comes from renewable 
sources, energy efficiency constitutes the greatest opportunity to address emissions 
reductions in the energy sector. Following this logic, the Costa Rican TNA focused more on 
demand-side technologies to increase energy efficiency. Addressing energy efficiency is also 
a means to reduce future demand for addition generation capacity, which would most likely 
have to be met by non-renewable sources. Energy efficiency in the energy sector is thus an 
opportunity for both emissions reduction and energy savings. However many barriers were 
identified in the TNA process that impede investments in energy efficiency. Costa Rican 
households spend 2% of their income on electricity, one of the lowest rates in the region, 
thanks to the country's higher per capita income and relatively low power prices owing to the 
large share of hydropower generation. Electricity tariffs are thus relatively low and constitute 
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a disincentive for consumers to pursue energy efficiency measures. This is exacerbated by the 
fact that second hand low-efficiency equipment is widely available at low prices.  
Another important barrier identified in the TNA is the lack of financial products 
tailored to energy efficiency investments. In general, the banks lack qualified personnel to 
assess energy efficiency projects and therefore such projects depend upon the payment 
capacity of the client and do not explicitly take into account the cost savings of the projects. 
Finally, although tax breaks exist for the importation of efficient materials and equipment 
these have had a low impact, which is also attributed to the readily available supply of low 
cost, second hand equipment. 
As previously mentioned, one of the government's key strategic objectives is to 
become a low GHG emission economy, which is laid out by the National Strategy for 
Climate Change (ENCC) and the target of reaching national carbon neutrality by 2021. To 
reach the carbon neutrality objective, a restructuring of the electricity sector is thus needed 
from a technological, policy and regulatory point of view. At present most investment in the 
electricity sector is made by the State. As such, the design and implementation of new 
policies, regulations and financial incentives will be needed in order to attract private sector 
investments in renewable technologies. At the same time electricity could be allowed to 
increase slowly so that consumers are incentivised to use energy in a rational manner, thus 
off-setting the risk of rapid future demand growth that would otherwise have to be met by 
non-renewable sources (Pratt, 2010). 
Cuba 
The contribution of Cuba to global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) is low, which, at 36.4 
MtCO2-eq, accounted for approximately 0.1% of total global emissions in 2004, excluding 
emissions from land-use change and forestry (CITMA, 2013). The energy sector, which 
includes electricity generation and transport, is the largest contributor to the national GHG 
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emissions, making up 71% of total gross emissions. However, Pérez et al. (2012) have shown 
that the CO2 produced from electricity generation will increase by 150% above 2010 levels 
by 2040, even if renewable energy makes up 50% of the generation capacity, reflecting the 
country's high dependence on oil for electricity generation. It is thus important to consider 
mitigation opportunities in the electricity sector, which also stand to offer strategic and 
economic benefits by diversifying the national energy mix and decreasing Cuba's dependence 
on imported fossil fuels. 
In 2011, domestic electrification stood at 97.7% and gross electricity output totalled 
17,754 GWh of which less than 1% was generated from renewable energy sources (ONE, 
2012). The electricity sector in Cuba is facing significant challenges due to a high reliance on 
oil and gas and a shortage of hard currency to investments in new infrastructure and finance 
the implementation of programmes for the rational use of energy. In addition, transmission 
lines throughout the country are susceptible to damage from tropical storms and hurricanes. 
The Cuban economy is centrally planned, overseen by the Cuban government, though 
there is significant foreign investment and private enterprise in some economic sectors, such 
as tourism. As with all public services, the electricity sector is governed and controlled by the 
State. The high proportion fossil fuel-based generation results in high, volatile, costs and very 
high carbon emission. Many financial and economic issues have been identified in the TNA 
process as key barriers impeding investments and development of renewable technologies in 
this sector. These include consumer tariffs for electricity that are highly subsidised, although 
this information is difficult to find and verify, which undermines external efforts to analyse 
the internal economic efficiency of the country's electricity sectors. In addition, external 
factors, such as Venezuelan supplies of cheap oil act to further distort the real economic cost 
of the electricity sector. Also need to comment on the dual currency in Cuba including the 
'convertible peso', which is pegged to the US dollar. However this 'hard' currency cannot be 
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spent outside Cuba, and so the government is obliged to spend it's USD and EUR reserves 
(which are received from exports and converted at state banks from remittances and tourists) 
in order to purchase equipment and hardware for infrastructures and industries, including the 
electricity sector. At the same time, consumer tariffs are paid from in Cuban pesos which 
have a lower value (CITMA, 2013). The exchange rate over the last years has ranged from 
20-25 Cuban pesos to 1 USD. In this context, the Cuban government lacks liquidity to invest 
in its own renewable energy programmes or to purchase and maintain equipment for 
electricity generation, transport and distribution. 
One of the weaknesses in the electricity sector in Cuba is the lack of opportunities for 
private sector participation and competitiveness, which means that there are no purely large-
scale private businesses. This was identified as a barrier to the transfer of low-carbon 
technology in the TNA process. However, in recent years, the Cuban government has tried to 
attract foreign private sector investments through the creation of mixed public-private 
enterprises. In this scheme, the foreign private party would bring the funds and the 
technology. Here, there is a strong element of speculation on behalf of investors, i.e. that the 
pursuit of low-cost assets and business partnerships may become highly profitable if and 
when the national economic model becomes more liberalised and integrated into to the global 
economy. Nonetheless, attracting 'sensible' foreign capital remains difficult as Cuba is still 
considered as a high-risk investment environment due to the commercial, economic, and 
financial embargo imposed by the United States. It should be noted that the same embargo 
acts as a major constraint to access many technologies and this has also been identified as an 
important barrier impeding access to renewable energy technologies. 
In Cuba, there is no specific law or legal framework for the electricity sector, 
including a lack of any legal framework for the development of renewable energy. Although 
incorporating renewable sources of energy into the energy mix has been a priority since the 
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early 1990s, there has been minimal progress and so the government is determined to 
accelerate the process. Currently, many feasibility studies of decentralized (off-grid) energy 
sources are underway in order to increase the energy security of the country and to provide 
electricity access to the non-electrified population. These include technologies such as small-
scale wind, biomass, photovoltaic panels, mini-hydropower plants, hybrid systems, and 
biogas. The government has also launched large programs to restructure the electricity sector 
in order to address the power crisis, such as the “Revolución Energética” launched in 2006. 
The Revolución Energética refers to a set of measures to address the generation, distribution 
and demand side aspects of the electricity market. It focuses in particular on energy 
efficiency and conservation; increasing the availability and reliability of the national electric 
grid; incorporating more renewable energy technologies into their energy portfolio; 
increasing the exploration and production of local oil and gas; and expanding the role of 
international co-operation. Under this programme Cuba became the first country in the world 
to eliminate the use of inefficient incandescent light bulbs, which, although not primarily 
intended to reduce GHG emissions, has had this effect.  
Until 2012, the institutional framework of the energy sector in Cuba differed from that 
of most other countries in that it lacked a Ministry of Energy. The Ministry of Economy and 
Planning (MEP) was responsible for the coordination of the Energy Commission, which in 
turn was responsible for the formulation and monitoring of the national energy strategy, 
including the promotion of energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources. 
However in February 2012, the Council of Ministries created the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines as a result of the transformation of the former Ministry of Basic Industries (MINBAS), 
which, among other function, had previously controlled the National Electric Union. Among 
its function, this new Ministry assumed responsibility for all activities related to the electrical 
sector. This can be considered as a first key step in the formalisation of a national energy 
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policy and in the restructuring of the governance framework, which could lead to the 
development of new laws to incentivise investment in renewable energy and, energy 
efficiency. 
Dominican Republic 
The contribution of Dominican Republic to global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) is 
relatively low, in both absolute and per-capita terms. In 2000, the country emitted about 27.7 
MtCO2 including emissions from land-use change. However the carbon intensity of the 
country is relatively high about 0.5 kg CO2-eq/$PIBPPP (World Bank, 2010). The energy 
sector, which includes electricity generation and transport, is the major contributor to the 
national GHG emissions. In the case of electricity generation, GHG emissions increased from 
1.87 MtCO2-eq in 1990 to 9.2 MtCO2-eq in 2000, thus accounting for 33.2% of national CO2 
emissions. As such, numerous studies have identified the energy sector as having a relatively 
high potential for GHG emissions reductions in the Dominican Republic (MMRN, 2013). 
Mitigation opportunities exist on both the demand-side, i.e. by improving energy efficiency, 
and on the supply-side by introducing renewable and lower-carbon energy technologies in the 
electricity generation mix. According to the country's TNA, the implementation of mitigation 
actions in the electricity sector would also have positive macro-economic effects, not least of 
all in reducing the national dependence on imported fuels. 
The electricity sector went through a privatization process at the end of the 1990s 
when the government sold the electricity generation infrastructure in order to incentive 
independent, private production. The sector is governed by the General Law of Electricity 
125-01 enacted in 2001 and modified by the Law 186-07 in 2007. These laws established the 
general legal and regulatory framework for the electricity sector and govern the generation, 
transmission, distribution and retail of electricity. The legal framework also regulates the 
roles of the institutions related to these functions, where the generation and distribution stages 
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are owned and operated by private companies, and transmission and hydroelectric generation 
to the State. As such, the law recognizes the importance of the private sector in the 
generation, distribution and retail of electricity, with the objective of expanding and 
improving the quality and efficiency of the national electricity supply, while giving the 
regulatory function of the sector to the State (MMRN, 2013). In 2012, 86% of electricity 
generation came from the private sector, with approximately 50% private participation in the 
distribution sector, while the State governs the whole transmission system. The Dominican 
Republic can thus be thought of as a hybrid electricity market, where state control and 
investment decisions continue to steer the market. 
The energy sector in Dominican Republic is facing significant supply challenges and 
the electricity sector is considered to be a major constraint on the country's economic growth. 
The electricity supply is characterized by frequent and long blackouts, while consumer tariffs 
are among the highest in the Latin American and Caribbean region. To some extent this 
reflects the relatively high generation costs, of approximately US$180 per MWh (compared 
to less than US$60 in Argentina). Different factors contribute to this situation, reliance 
dependence on imported oil. Indeed the country imports 100% of its fossil fuels, which 
includes oil products used for electricity generation, making Dominican Republic very 
vulnerable to price volatilities in the global price of oil. 88% of the electricity generation is 
fossil-fuel based; the remainder 12% generated from renewable sources, mainly hydroelectric 
plants (SEMARENA, 2012). Other factors are the high commercial risks faced by private 
generators such as non-payment, the difficulties of pursue large commercial and industrial 
non-paying customers and the high operating costs of the distribution companies and grid 
operators (MMRN, 2013). In addition fossil fuels are largely subsidised by the government, 
thus increases in the global oil price inflate public-sector debt, which in turn undermines the 
state’s ability to invest in public infrastructure, including the energy sector. It has been 
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estimated that in 2008, subsidies exceeded US$ 1 billion, or 3% of GDP. Decreasing the 
country's reliance on fossil fuels would thus benefit both energy security and enable emission 
reductions, while freeing up foreign exchange which could be used instead to purchase low-
carbon energy technologies, offering a means to further break the vicious circle of fossil fuel 
dependency. 
Although Dominican Republic has already invested in hydro technologies, a lot of 
opportunities are still available for the country to invest in renewable technologies for 
electricity generation, among other photovoltaic, wind and biomass. Energy efficiency 
measures represent another way to address emission reductions and cope with energy demand 
growth and at short term handle the problem of the electricity supply limits. Up to now, 
policies implemented in relation with promoting private investments for renewable energy in 
the energy sector, such as the Energy and Special Regimes 57-07 approved in 2007, have 
been focusing on special fiscal conditions such as tax exemptions and other financial 
incentives such as FIT for the purchase and installation of grid-connected renewable energy 
systems although some major barriers remain, hindering sustained growth in the renewables 
sector (worldwatch, 2012). In the TNA process, the government in the Dominican Republic 
has placed an emphasis on demand-side management of energy resources, thus prioritising 
energy efficiency technologies. The lack of financial incentives has been identified as a 
significant barrier to scaling up investments in EE technologies. In addition, in governmental 
entities, a shift to EE measure or equipment is highly disincentivated by government 
subsidised. These barriers are exacerbated by the government's own lack of policy support for 
EE technologies. As an example, a shift from CFLs, already in wide use as a 'low-hanging 
fruit' of energy efficiency, to LED lighting systems is hindered by high initial investment cost 
for the purchase and installation of LED technology in absence of adequate policy and 
regulatory framework. This, combined with long pay-back period for commercial and 
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residential retro-fit technologies for energy efficiency, reflect the relatively low cost of 
electricity as compared to the high cost of LED lighting systems. 
Conclusions 
In this article we have discussed four countries with differing electricity market structures, 
which influence the governance and incentives required to enable the transfer of low-carbon 
generation technologies. These range from the largely-private owned and operated market in 
Argentina to the State-controlled model in Cuba, with the majority State-run system in Costa 
Rica and the 'hybrid' ownership model in the Dominican Republic, with varying degrees of 
explicit regulation. These market structures also influence (and are often influenced by) the 
type of primary energy used in each country, where in Argentina lower-cost natural gas 
combustion is the generation technology of choice for investors in a highly competitive, 
liberalised wholesale electricity market. In Costa Rica, the majority of electricity is generated 
by a few large hydro installations, whereas the island States of Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic are highly dependent on imported diesel and other oil products for electricity 
generation.  
In common with most of the 32 countries that completed a TNA between 2010 and 
2013, a range of non-financial barriers, including various degrees of human and institutional 
capacity gaps, were highlighted by the four countries analysed in this article. However it is 
financial and economic barriers and constraints that were deemed by the countries to be of 
primary importance, which serve to undermine incentives for investment in RETs and/or 
energy efficiency technologies. Despite the differences between countries and market 
structures, it is clear that the procurement and uptake or dissemination of low-carbon 
technologies is faced with financial and economic barriers that transcend issues of private vs. 
public investment. Specifically, these economic barriers are more a function of the primary 
energy resources available in countries, as well as various macro-economic settings, than the 
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structure of the market per se. In particular, the issue of subsidies also looms large as a 
'bigger-picture' barrier to the uptake of RETs, either in the form of government support for 
imported fossil fuels (as in the case of the Dominican Republic), or as a more targeted 
subsidy for consumer tariffs (Cuba). Although such subsidies are applied at different levels, 
they have the same net effect of divorcing tariffs from the cost of generating the electricity, 
which can lead to bloated public finance deficits and undermine incentives for investment in 
modern, clean generation technologies and/or rational consumption. In the case of Costa Rica 
the opposite applies, where the main barrier to investment is RETs is the country's heavy 
dependence on cheap hydro energy (where maximum capacity has already been reached) that 
is driving up demand, thus pushing the country towards the use of fossil fuel generation, as 
the lowest-cost alternative. While it could be argued, on the grounds of market 'efficiency', 
that demand should be allowed to increase and then slowdown in the face of higher future 
prices, the government of Costa Rica have the option of imposing energy taxes instead, where 
revenues could be used to finance support for efficiency technologies, thus providing a duel 
break on electricity demand growth. From a resource conservation point of view, that would 
appear to be the most efficient, rational, policy option. 
Cuba's political-economic context is a 'special' case that presents a seemingly unique 
set of financial and economic barriers to the use of low-carbon technologies. While not 
wishing to undermine the significance of the trade embargo imposed on Cuba, the main 
economic challenge concerns the monetary system, where major hard currencies are in short 
supply in Cuba, though these are needed, by State agencies, to purchase technologies from 
abroad. Here, some parallels can be drawn with Argentina after their economic and political 
crisis in 2001 led to a 70% devaluation of the Peso, which had previously been pegged to the 
US dollar. In this situation the government chose to freeze electricity tariffs so as to protect 
consumers from the privatised utilities, most of which were foreign-owned, seeking to 're-
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adjust' their tariffs to compensate for the loss in dollar revenues. While that situation bears 
little comparison to Cuba, the post-2002 tariff freeze also had the effect of breaking the flow 
of cutting-edge technologies to Argentina, experienced during the 1990s due to the 
prohibitive cost of purchasing dollar-priced assets in devalued local Pesos. Overall, the 
conclusions of the country-led TNA processes indicate that the type and strength of the 
financial and economic barriers to low-carbon technology transfer transcends the market 
structures. As such, the natural resource base and/or energy mix in each country plays a more 
significant role than does the ownership and regulation model of the electricity market. While 
these are broad-based findings, they correspond strongly to the findings of previous major 
studies on the relationship between electricity market structures and technology transfer, and 
are likely to contribute to both technical and political debates framed by the Technology 
Mechanism of the UNFCCC. 
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Annex 1 - Results of the prioritization of mitigation technologies in the electricity sub-
sector in Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba and Dominican Republic (taken from official 
TNA reports) 
 
 Argentina Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic 
1 Steam Turbine Conservation and energy 
efficiency in industrial 
and residential sectors 
Combined cycle with 
gas (CCGT) 
Use of more efficient 
equipment (efficient 
light bulbs – LED) 
2 Gas Turbine Cleaner Electric 
expansion  plan 
(diversification of the 
energy matrix in Costa 
Rica) 
Switch to gas in thermal 
generation plants  
Use of biomass for 
electricity generation 
3 Otto Internal 
Combustion Engine 
Distributed generation 
system (from water, 
wind, sun or wastes) 
Micro/mini/medium-
hydroelectric plant 
Photovoltaic 
4 Diesel Internal 
Combustion Engine 
 Combined cycle turbines 
with integrated 
gasification using forest 
biomass 
Wind 
5 Cheng Cycle  Condensing-extraction 
steam turbine with 
bagasse 
Modification of plant to 
switch from diesel or 
bunker C to natural gas 
6 External Combustion 
Gas Turbine 
 Grid-connected wind 
power 
Solar thermic 
7 Organic Rankine 
Cycle Engine 
 Grid-connected solar PV Micro-hydroelectric 
plant 
8   Nuclear power Cogeneration 
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Annex 2 - Comparative institutions: electricity markets, regulations and key financial 
and economic barriers to investment in low-carbon technologies (adapted from TNA 
reports, and secondary sources)  
 
ARGENTINA DOM REP CUBA COSTA RICA 
- Low tariffs for grid-
connected electricity 
and gas 
 
- High capital cost of 
investment in 
cogeneration systems  
 
- Lack of relevant 
financing mechanisms, 
including soft loans, to 
drive investment in 
cogeneration 
technologies 
 
- Additional investment 
costs associated with 
modifications to 
infrastructure that allow 
for fuel switching (for 
example from natural 
gas to biomass), and 
well new grid 
connections. 
 
- Additional costs for 
external skilled labour 
to operate and maintain 
new cogeneration 
technologies 
 
- Uncertainty caused by 
price volatility of fossil 
fuels, in particular 
natural gas which is the 
primary fuel for 
cogeneration 
technologies 
 
 
- Lack of financial 
incentives for investors 
 
- High initial investment 
cost (for the purchase 
and installation of LED 
technology) 
 
- Insufficient financial 
support from the 
government for 
investment in EE 
 
- Disincentive for the 
technological 
shift/change in 
governmental entities 
 
- Inexistence of a 
guarantee funds to 
encourage lending from 
private banks 
 
 
- Insufficient (state) 
financial resources 
 
- Limited access to credit 
markets 
 
- Absence of positive 
financial incentives to 
develop capacities in 
national industries 
 
- No consideration for 
environmental 
externalities in the 
decisions making 
process 
 
- Existing subsidies for 
electricity, translating 
into very low consumer 
tariffs 
 
- The existence of 
national monetary 
duality undermines 
financial stability and 
ability to pay for 
foreign equipment, 
often due to a lack of 
hard currency 
 
- Lack of liquidity in the 
grid operator to make 
investments (due to 
electricity subsidies; 
consumers pay after 
use; consumers pay in 
Cuban pesos and not 
convertible pesos) 
 
- Electricity tariffs 
relatively low, hence 
reduced incentive to 
increase energy 
efficiency 
 
- Lack of financial 
products, i.e. specific 
loans for EE 
investments 
 
- Tax exoneration with 
low impact on purchase 
for efficient equipment 
 
- High cost of state of the 
art technologies, 
compared to second 
hand equipment with 
low efficiency 
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